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Thirty  years  ago,  the  U.S.  Steel  Corporation  decided  to  close  a  plant  in 
Youngstown, Ohio.  The factory was the mainstay of the town and its closing was likely 
to have a devastating impact on the local economy as well as the lives of all the workers 
who would be laid off.  The union did all it could to keep the factory open, but to no 
avail.  In a final burst of creativity, the union came up with the idea of buying the 
factory from the company.  If they won't run it, maybe we can.  But the company 
adamantly refused to consider selling to the union.  It took the inconsistent positions 
that the factory was unprofitable and that if the union did operate it that the union 
would  be  competing  with  the  old  employer  and  illegitimately  harming  U.S.  Steel's 
business.  In the face of this intransigence, the union went to court.  Among other 
things, it asked the court to order the company to sell the factory to the union upon 
payment of fair market value.  In effect, the union claimed that it, or the town, had a 
right of first refusal in the property.  
Trial Judge Lambros was sympathetic.  “[I]t seems to me,” he said, “that a property 
right has arisen from this lengthy, long-established relationship between United States 
Steel, the steel industry as an institution, the community in Youngstown, the people in 
Mahoning County and the Mahoning Valley in having given and devoted their lives to 
this industry.”
1  Yet when push came to shove, Judge Lambros felt that he could find no 
precedent in Ohio law for such a property right and that finding was upheld by the 
Sixth Circuit.
2  Because precedent is far from unchanging and because I shared Judge 
Lambros’ instinct that a long relationship may create property rights when the owner 
shares access to the property with another, I wrote an article entitled The Reliance 
Interest in Property, in which I argued that Judge Lambros could have interpreted the 
common law to find such a property right.
3  In addition, I sugges ted a number of 
remedies, two of which I want to revisit now.  First, I argued that the court could have 
and should have recognized a right of first refusal in either the union or the town, 
enforceable by injunctive relief ordering the company to transfer  title for fair market 
value.  Second, I argued that the town could exercise its power of eminent domain to 
take the property from U.S. Steel and transfer it to the union or to another employer 
who would agree to operate the factory. 
I must admit that my ar gument was more utopian than realistic.  If even as 
sympathetic a judge as Lambros would not find any rights in the union, it was unlikely 
that others would do so.  The courts seemed to frame that argument as a demand that 
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plants never close; this argument seemed a non-starter if a plant was unprofitable and 
the  courts  felt  obligated  to  defer  to  corporate  judgments  about  profitability.    In 
addition, they felt that companies are “owned” by the shareholders and that the main 
purpose of a corporation is to maximize profits.  If that depends on shedding workers, 
so be it.  The conventional view is that workers may be stakeholders in corporations 
but  they  have  no  rights  other  than  those  they  bargained  for  in  their  employment 
contracts. 
What struck me as problematic about this way of framing the issue was that it is 
simply  not  the  case  that  owners  have  absolute  rights  or  that  the  formal  terms  of 
contracts are the only obligations attendant to contractual relationships.  The rights of 
owners are limited in many ways and they are especially limited when owners allow 
non-owners access to their property.  Nor are contractual relationships wholly defined 
by the words in the agreement; both common law and statutory law impose minimum 
standards  on  all  contractual  relationships  to  ensure  that  contracting  parties  do  not 
engage in fraudulent, deceptive, or unfair practices and to ensure that the relationship is 
subject to minimum standards designed to recognize the dignity and humanity of the 
parties.
4 
My argument was not whol ly without support politically.   Congress did partially 
respond by passing a statute that guaranteed notice before closing factories in 
circumstances such as this.
5  Notice helps but does not alter the balance of power 
between employers and employees in  these situations.  It especially does not require 
companies to consider the externalities involved in closing factories and laying off 
workers.  
What has changed thirty years later?  There is good news and bad news.  The good 
news first.  Despite our increasingly conservative Supreme Court, a slim majority of 
Justices would probably approve statutory or common law remedies granting the union 
a right of first refusal and the town the right to seize the property by eminent domain.  
More broadly, the current sub prime crisis has made it abundantly clear that the 
creation of a property right is not a self -regarding act.  The banking and mortgage 
industries created and marketed subprime mortgages which they then securitized and 
insured with credit default swaps lacking any backing.  When the housing bubble burst, 
these property rights wrecked the world economy.  It is apparent to all that regulations 
of property are needed to prevent and respond to the externalities associated with 
arrangements that are indifferent t o the rights and needs of third parties and to the 
nation as a whole. 
The bad news is the subprime crisis spawned a political movement called the Tea 
Party whose main preoccupation seems to be the dismantling of  “big government.”  
This libertarian view is bolstered by a determined minority of Justices composed of 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas who have been trying 
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mightily to expand constitutional protection for property rights.  By property rights they 
mean the rights of the rich and powerful, not those of workers or tenants.  These 
Justices would probably rule that a law granting the union a right of first refusal would 
constitute a taking of the company's property without just compensation and that a law 
mandating  such  a  transfer  with  compensation  would  violate  the  public  use  clause.  
Moreover, their view has had a substantial impact on state law which is authorized to 
protect property rights more expansively than the U.S. Constitution requires.  At least 
one state has ruled that a statute granting mobile home owners a right of first refusal 
when the landlord wants to sell the land under their homes not only constitutes a taking 
of property but would not satisfy the public use test because the property would be 
transferred from one private owner to another.
6 
Since the Kelo decision,
7 Ohio passed a statute prohibiting takings of property for 
transfer from one owner to another unless the property is “blighted.”
8  It is unlikely that 
an abandoned factory would constitute “blighted” property unless it were also deemed 
to be dilapidated or otherwise in a dangerous condition.  If that is so, then the state of 
Ohio  and  the  town  of  Youngstown  would  be  powerless  to  mandate  a  transfer  of 
property  from  the  company  to  the  union  or  to  the  town  even  if  it  provided  just 
compensation.  That  means  that  things  have  gotten  worse,  not  better,  since  the 
Youngstown case was decided.  
In the current economic crisis, the focus has been on shoring up the banking system 
even if this means subsidizing the very institutions that caused the financial crisis in the 
first place.  Efforts to protect homeowners from displacement through foreclosure have 
been weak or ineffective.  And despite rising and painful unemployment, attention to 
job  creation  has  been  almost  nil  even  from  the  Obama  administration,  which  is 
sympathetic  to the  cause.    beNow  it may  be  that  there  are  limits  to  the  politically 
possible and that some things had to be done first before focusing on job creation or 
protection of displaced home owners.  At the same time, it is apparent that Congress 
has no appetite for large public expenditures designed to promote employment.
9 
What is to be done? We need a new way of framing issues that can bring to center 
stage the rights and legitimate interests of o rdinary people—what we used to call “the 
common man” — and woman.  For too long, we have allowed both politicians and 
judges  to  frame  issues  in  a  conservative  manner,  equating  government  action  with 
oppression and twisting the rhetoric of property rights to justify allowing the powerful to 
oppress  the  weak.    Our  common  language  has  too  long  lingered  in  a  libertarian 
direction, excoriating government as oppressive and branding private corporations as 
persons like you and me.  It would behoove us to remember some truths that we may 
have forgotten. 
We live in a free and democratic society and such societies are not characterized by 
absolute property rights.  Indeed, our system comes from rebellion against the absolute 
property rights of the King in England.  Over time, the common law limited the rights 
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of the king and of his lords to push power downward to the people who lived on the 
land.    The  defining  characteristic  of  American  property  law  is  the  abolition  of 
feudalism.  That means that we regulate property relationships to ensure that each 
person has freedom, dignity, and access to the means of a comfortable life.  We do not 
abide concentrations of property in the form of company towns, monopolies, or feudal 
manors.  Over hundreds of years, the courts and legislatures have redefined property 
rights  to  protect  the  rights  of  non-owners.    As  the  Supreme  Court  of  New  Jersey 
famously  said  in  1982,  “[t]itle  to  real  property  cannot  include  dominion  over  the 
destiny of persons the owner permits to come upon the premises.  Their well-being 
must remain the paramount concern of a system of law.”
10 
Free and democratic societies believe in the equality of individuals and this does not 
mean  the  equal  right  to  starve.    It  means  that  resources  must  be  divided  and  the 
economy managed so as to give each person a realistic opportunity to live a full and 
comfortable life.  Democracies regulate property rights to ensure that each person has 
access to property; they do not simply hand out property and then see what happens. 
The  means  to  do  this  will  vary  over  time.    Globalization  and  the  decrease  in 
unionization  are  facts  we  cannot  ignore.    But  what  we  cannot  relinquish  is  the 
democratic ideal which recognizes that a people is not free if each person is not treated 
with dignity.  The equal worth of all persons means that our property system — and our 
employment  system  —  must  be  structured  so  as  to  allow  each  person  to  work  or 
otherwise participate in economic life and to do so in a manner that leaves each of us 
comfortable.  Nor does this principle constitute an attack on property rights.  Rather, it 
protects the property rights of all—defined by Jefferson as the rights to life, liberty, and 
the pursuit of happiness.  That is the lesson of the Youngstown case. 
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